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ABSTRACT:    Heim (2010) found a strong negative relationship between deficits and private consumer 
and investment spending, controlling for other key variables.  The study did not directly test the 
mechanism by which deficits were related to consumer and investment spending, only the result.  Crowd 
out theory hypothesizes the mechanism is consumer and investment credit shortages induced by 
borrowing -financed government deficits.  This paper examines that mechanism directly, testing to see if 
private borrowing is related to deficits.  It uses Federal Reserve Flow of Funds accounts data on 
borrowing.  The paper finds a strong negative relationship between deficits and private borrowing, with 
deficits reducing private borrowing dollar for dollar. The borrowing estimates are very similar to the Heim 
(2010) estimates of deficit effects on consumer and investment spending, suggesting crowd out effects 
work through the borrowing channel and fully offset the stimulus effects of deficits.  Flow of Funds data on 
savings and investment, for accounting reasons, confirm the econometric findings of full crowd out, 
provided savings remain constant.  JEL Codes: C50, C51, E12, E21, E22 
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1.0.   INTRODUCTION 
 
By “crowd out” we mean the reduction in loanable funds (savings) available to consumers and businesses 
that occurs when government borrows from the savings pool to finance deficits caused by i.e., increased 
government spending or decreased taxes. Private borrowing is consistently used to supplement the 
purchasing power of consumer and business incomes, for example, when consumers buy a house or 
businesses borrow to buy new machinery.  Crowd out, by reducing the savings available for such 
purposes, “crowds out” private spending, and this spending reduction offsets some or all of the stimulus 
effect of the government deficits.  
 
Heim (2010) used a 23 equation econometric model of the U.S. economy to evaluate crowd out problems 
and the extent to which government deficits reduced private consumer and investment spending.  Data 
were from BEA.  The results indicated that when a government deficit variable representing crowd out 
was added to well specified consumption and investment equations, it showed a negative relationship 
between the deficit and private consumer and investment spending, was statistically significant, and 
added substantially to explained variance.  The study did not directly show the mechanism by which 
deficits were related to consumer and investment spending.  Crowd out theory requires that reduced 
private borrowing, induced by deficits, be the mechanism causing the decline.  Since other factors were 
controlled for, this was inferred to be the cause.  This paper tests the crowd out mechanism hypothesis 
directly, testing to see if private borrowing is related to deficits.  It uses Federal Reserve Flow of Funds 
accounts data on consumer, business and government borrowing.  
 
Using the same models of consumption and investment used by Heim (2010), plus additional controls for 
borrowing, the paper examines whether testing reveals 
 
  a negative relationship between deficits and private borrowing 
 
  a positive relationship between private borrowing and spending 
 
  if adding private borrowing to the Heim (2010) models increases their ability to explain consumer 
and investment spending.  
 
  If crowd out, is a factor in recessions, since demand for borrowed funds drops.  The 1981- 83 
recession period is examined to test this hypothesis.  
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2.0  THEORY OF CROWD OUT 
 
2.1.  THE NO - CROWD OUT MODEL 
 
A typical demand driven model of the economy does not allow for borrowing - related crowd out.  In such 
models the impact of taxes and government spending are derived using the GDP identity: 
 
  GDP  =  Y  =  C   +  I  + G +  (X-M)                      (1) 
 
A simple consumption function might be given as a linear function of disposable income (Y-T) 
 
C = β(Y-T)                       (2) 
substituting C into (1) gives 
   _    _ 
            Y  = |     1        |  *  [ - βT + I  +G + X-M) ]                   (3) 
      |_ (1-β)   _|    
 
 
MULTIPLIER EFFECT OF ∆ T, ∆ G :  
     _   _                _          _  
          |    - β      |      |     1       |                   (4) 
    |_ (1-β)  _|         |_ (1-β) _|    
                     Tax Multiplier                              Spending Multiplier 
 
The clear expectation of standard model demand theory is that tax changes in are expected to be 
negatively related to the GDP, with a multiplier effect -β /(1-β).  Changes in government spending and net 
exports are related to GDP in the positive direction, with a multiplier effect 1/(1-β) and should when 
tested, have the same coefficients.  In Section 2 below, we will test these expected relationships to see if 
actual econometric estimates yield the predicted results for variables.   
 
 
2.2.  THE CROWD OUT MODEL 
 
However, to test the hypothesis that savings used to finance consumer credit is diverted to finance 
government deficits, the simplified consumption function must be modified to add the crowd out - causing 
factor (T-G),  where (T-G) = taxes minus government spending:  
 
C = β (Y-T) + λ(T-G)                             (5) 
 
where lambda (λ) represents the marginal effect of deficit spending on consumer demand.  With this 
function, the Keynesian model becomes 
 
GDP  =       Y  =   β (Y-T) + λ(T-G)                     +  G   + I   + (X-M)    
    =   [1/(1- β)]  [ (-β+ λ) T     +  (1- λ) G   + I   + (X-M) ]                  (6) 
 
From which we can easily see that the impact of a change in T or G on the GDP depends on λ as well as 
β, and the spending multiplier 1/(1- β).  The tax multiplier, showing the marginal impact of a change in 
taxes is now (-β+ λ)/ (1- β).  The spending multiplier, showing the marginal impact of a change in 
government spending,  is now (1-λ)/(1-β).   Both T and G marginal effects on the GDP will be smaller (in 
absolute terms) than they would have been without crowd out effects.   
 
Notice in Graph 1 below that actual real consumption tends(billions of 1996 dollars)  to be below its 
normal trend as a function of disposable income in the 1980’s and 1990’s, a period of crowd out, until 
1998 - 2000 when budget deficits ( crowd out) disappeared and budget surpluses occurred. ( the late 80’s 






We can expand this model to include effects of crowd out on investment spending. Assume a simple 
investment model in which investment is determined by real interest rates (r) and access to credit, which 
varies with the government deficit (T-G). 
 
I =  γ(T-G)  - θ r                             (7) 
 
where gamma (γ) indicates the marginal effect of crowd out (the government deficit) on investment 
spending, and (θ) represents the marginal effect of real interest rates (r).  
 
How the crowd out problem may affect investment is given in the following graph, where the top two 
curves show the average relationship of investment to GDP 1960-2000, and how actual investment 
deviates from the average values each year.  Note particularly that during the high deficit years in the mid 
and late eighties, investment fell well below long term averages, but in the 1996-98 surplus years, actual 
investment exceeded long term averages.  The lowest curve on the graph merely indicates the real dollar 
amount, by which actual investment exceeded predictions (read using left scale)  
 
If we replace investment in the GDP identity with its hypothesized determinants, we obtain a typical 
Keynesian IS equation:    
 
GDP  =  Y  = =   [1/1- β]   [ (-β+ λ+ γ) T + (1- λ-γ) G  - θ r  +  (X-M) ]                  (8) 
 
In this IS equation, the normal stimulating impact of tax cuts on the GDP (-β) is offset in part by the effects 
of deficit – induced changes in credit available to consumers and investors (λ+γ).  Tax stimulus effects 
may switch from negative to positive if the crowd out effects (λ+ γ) are larger than the disposable income 
effect (-β).  The effect of a change in government spending is also reduced per dollar of expenditure from 
(1) to (1- λ-γ), and stimulus effects are either reduced or become negative.  Again, the net exports 
multiplier effect stays the same, now becoming an even stronger stimulus relative to government 
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EFFECTS OF CONSUMER AND INVESTMENT CREDIT CROWD OUT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
TAXES AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING STIMULUS 
                                . 
      Without    With              Without         With 
Crowd Out  Crowd Out          Crowd Out  Crowd Out 
Tax coefficient    (-β)    (-β+ λ+ γ)           Government Spending Coefficient    1         (1- λ- γ) 
 
Tax Multiplier     (-β)    (-β+ λ+ γ )          Government Spending Multiplier      (1)         (1-λ- γ) 
    (1-β)        (1- β)                (1-β)          (1-β) 
                                . 
 
 
2.3. OTHER STUDIES  
 
Considering that the efficacy of a major part stimulus theory hangs on whether or not borrowing financed 
deficits crowd out private borrowing,  and therefore private spending, there has been no scientific work 
done testing the connection of borrowing to deficits, and little done even indirectly, by testing the 
relationship between actual private spending and deficits. 
 
That said, the popular press is full of discussion of crowd out effects that are based on the assumption 
that crowd out does or does not work. For example: 
 
1.  Chan, S. (NY Times, 2/7/10, p.A16): reported the I.M.F. warned on Jan. 26 that rising sovereign debt 
"could crowd out private sector credit growth, gradually raising interest rates for private borrowers and 
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2.  Barley, R. (Wall Street Journal, 2/24/10 p.C14): “any government-bond buying by banks is another 
form of crowding out, potentially reducing supply of consumer and corporate lending”  
 
 
3.  Krugman (New York Times, 9/28/09) notes that in recessions, the accelerator effect is likely to 
dominate any crowd out effect, leaving a net stimulus effect of government spending increases or tax 
cuts.   
 
In the professional literature, studies studies examining crowd out have been entirely, or principally, 
reports on other people’s science (or lack of it), i.e., literature reviews.  For example, Spencer and Yohe, 
(1970), in reviewing the literature, found that the dominant view the past two hundred years from all types 
of studies has been that government deficits cause crowding out.  Friedman’s work (1978) is largely 
theoretical, though it contains some references to his and others’ empirical work. He shows portfolio 
theory suggests the LM curve may shift in response to an IS shift due to a fiscal stimulus like a 
government deficit, and that elasticity of substitution between bonds and stocks when interest rates rise 
(due to deficit borrowing) is key: elasticities less than one lead to crowd out; greater than one: crowd in.  
Therefore crowd out effects are indeterminate theoretically.  Friedman’s own empirical tests, based on 
money demand models, were more ambiguous. 
 
   Gale and Orszag’s work (2004) does include some empirical testing indicating crowd out matters.  
Consumer demand was hypothesized to be a function of current and one period lagged Net National 
Product (NNP), government purchases, taxes, transfer payments, interest payments and the size of the 
government debt.  A negative relationship between taxes and GDP were taken as a sign that crowd out, if 
it existed, was not complete.  That said, their tested hypothesis did not include the government deficit as 
an explanatory variable.  This can result in stimulus effects of tax cuts being overstated (Heim 2010, and 
section 2.2 above).  Other tests also indicated a positive relationship between interest rates and deficits, 
taken as an indicator of crowd out, but does not address the fact that the interest rates most 
systematically associated with the GDP are exogenously determined rates, the federal funds and prime 
interest rates, not supply and demand driven rates (Heim, 2008).   
 
Using a VAR methodology, Montford and Uhlig (2008) found investment falls in response to both 
spending increases and tax increases (finding the same sign on both spending and tax effects is 
inconsistent with both Keynesian stimulus theory and crowd out theory)  The VAR specified consumption 
or investment as being a function of six lagged values of each of ten variables:  GDP, C, G, Taxes, real 
wages, private non-residential I, adjusted reserves, the PPI index and the GDP deflator.  Interpreting VAR 
model findings can be difficult, since the tested hypotheses typically are somewhat-atheoretical.   Also 
using a VAR model, Blanchard and Perrotti (2002) when testing taxes and government spending obtained 
the same result for investment, but more Keynesian results for total output, and non-Keynesian results for 
consumption. 
 
Furceri and Sousa (2009) examine 145 countries using a VAR methodology to determine if government 
spending as a % of GDP was related to consumption and investment spending as a % of GDP, They 
conclude government spending is adversely related.  Fundamentally the model tests consumption and 
investment spending against right - side variables fixed effects variables for the individual countries and 
the current and four lagged values of the government spending/ GDP variable.  While many of the 
government spending variables had statistically significant adverse effects, the lack of controls for other 
structural variables makes it difficult to be sure the finding truly represent the government spending effect, 
and not perhaps occur because government spending can proxy for non-included variables.  
 
2.4.  REAL GOVERNMENT DEFICITS   
 
Table 2 below shows combined real federal, state and local government budget surpluses and deficits.  It  
shows a period generally characterized as one of government surpluses up until 1970, sizable deficits 





     TABLE 2 
GOVERNMENT SURPLUS/DEFICITS 1960-2000 (BILLIONS OF 1996 DOLLARS) 
                     
    
1959  $ $41.20 
 
1970  $-28.69 
 
1980  $-80.466 
 
1990  $-200 
1960  65.74 
 
1971  -74.34 
 
1981  -75.204 
 
1991  -253.4 
1961  38.26 
 
1972  -23.4 
 
1982  -206.02 
 
1992  -335.7 
1962  42.29 
 
1973  14.209 
 
1983  -248.24 
 
1993  -294.9 
1963  59.27 
 
1974  -13.21 
 
1984  -201.51 
 
1994  -214.8 
1964  38.10 
 
1975  -174.8 
 
1985  -209.95 
 
1995  -181 
1965  49.97 
 
1976  -112.2 
 
1986  -228.29 
 
1996  -115.4 
1966  51.98 
 
1977  -73.48 
 
1987  -175.75 
 
1997  -21.91 
1967  -6.18 
 
1978  -17.9 
 
1988  -153.59 
 
1998  81.469 
1968  27.44 
 
1979  3.1822 
 
1989  -135.18 
 
1999  151.34 
1969  74.70 
             
2000  227.08 
                     
Source: Economic Report of the President, 2002. 
 
 
3.0  CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT  DEMAND AS A FUNCTION PURCHASING POWER  
 
To the extent borrowing - financed deficits utilize savings previously available for private borrowing, a 
problem only arises if consumer or business demand is driven by total consumer purchasing power, not 
just income purchasing power. We define total purchasing power manifested in the market place as a 
function not only of income, but borrowing.  Let  
 
 (CBOR) = Net annual consumer borrowing = change in consumer indebtedness (∆CDEBT) that period.  
Consumer indebtedness data are taken from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data.   
Changes in the level of consumer borrowing are given as: ∆(CBOR).   
 
 (IBOR)   = Net annual business borrowing = business indebtedness (∆IDEBT) that occurs in that period.  
Business indebtedness data are taken from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data.  
Increases / decreases in the level of business borrowing are given as: ∆(IBOR). 
 
The basic theory is that both consumer and business money demand for goods and services is a function 
of consumer and business purchasing power, not just income, where purchasing power is defined as 
income, borrowing ability and any other factors (such as depreciation allowances) that influence how 
much is available to spend.   
 
Clearly, for crowd out to matter, private spending must be driven by access to borrowing as well as 
income.  Hence, we also have to show that private demand is better explained by purchasing power than 
by income alone, controlling for other relevant variables.  The hypotheses to be tested ( in first 
differences) are  
 
∆(consumption spending) =   ƒ( ∆ Determinants of consumption, including the ∆ in borrowing)   
 
∆(investment spending)    =   ƒ( ∆ Determinants of investment,  including the ∆ in borrowing)  
 
 




1960 - 2000 data on the determinants of consumption and investment spending from the Economic 
Report of the President and the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve were used to estimate 
the effects of a wide range of variables, including borrowing on consumption and investment spending.  
The specific variables are identified in later sections. 
 
Two -stage least squares  regression was used since both consumption and investment are driven in part 
by income related variables (disposable income or the accelerator), and therefore 2SLS was needed to 
avoid issues of simultaneity.  Data was tested in first differences instead of levels to address 
nonstationarity, serial correlation and multicollinearity issues commonly found in time series data.  Newey 
West corrections to standard errors were used to avoid heteroskedasticity problems.  
 
 
5.0.  FINDINGS: RELATIONSHIP OF CONSUMER BORROWING TO CONSUMER SPENDING  
 
If we examine the effect of deficits on consumption, holding consumer borrowing constant, we should 
expect to see the deficit having a lesser, or no, crowd out effect on consumption.  The observed effect 
may not drop to zero, since crowd out not only negatively affects consumption, but also investment.  
Declining investment may have secondary effects on consumption because its decline reduces income 
and taxes, increasing the deficit, causing secondary declines in consumption.  Therefore, controlling for 
the level of consumer borrowing may not fully eliminate the observed effect of the deficit on consumption, 
but should at least reduce it from the levels found in Heim (2010) where borrowing was not controlled for.   
 
Heim’s (no borrowing control) consumption function for domestically produced consumer goods was  
 
Domestically Produced Consumer Goods 
ΔCD =.36Δ(Y-T) +.27Δ(T -G) -4.49ΔPR+.24 ΔDJ-2+1.30 ΔXRAV -375.09ΔPOP16+.01ΔPOP+.23ΔICC-1+37.75ΔM2AV   R
2=86.0%     (9) 
 (t =)  (6.4)            (3.0)            (-1.6)          (1.3)         (1.3)        (-1.9)    (2.8)   (0.9)    (4.9)        D.W.= 1.9 
                                    
Where  
CD  = real domestically produced consumer goods and services 
(Y-T)    = real disposable income 
(T-G)   = real government deficit 
PR      =  real prime interest rate 
DJ-2     =   a measure of wealth (Dow Jones Composite Index), lagged two years  
XRAV   = exchange rate average for current and past three years 
POP16   = ratio of young to old in population 
POP     =population size 
ICC-1    = Index of Consumer Confidence (Conference Board) , lagged one year 
M2AV    = real M2 money supply, average of past three years 
 
If we add an additional variable to control for consumer borrowing (CBOR), the reestimated regression 
results become 
 
ΔCD   =.39Δ(Y-TG) +.18Δ(T -G) -2.67ΔPR+.42 ΔDJ-2  - 0.25 ΔXRAV   -418.90ΔPOP16+.01ΔPOP+.05ΔICC-1 
 (t =)               (4.0)             (2.0)            (-0.9)          (2.0)         (-0.2)        (-2.0)                (3.3)          (0.2)   
                  +35.48ΔM2AV   + .20 ΔCBOR      R
2=88.0%       (10) 
                  (5.3)              (2.3)          D.W.= 1.8 
 
Our results indicate every dollar borrowed by consumers results in and additional $0.20 cents spending 
on domestically produced consumer goods.  The remainder would be spent on housing (investment) and 
imported consumer goods.   
  
Crowd out theory is based on the premise that the major determinant of consumer demand is not 
disposable income, but purchasing power, i.e. disposable income plus consumer borrowing.  If we 
consolidate the two into one variable, we should improve our results.  The equation below provides the 




ΔCD        = .25Δ [(Y-TG++ CBOR] +.17Δ(T -G) -2.26ΔPR+.47 ΔDJ-2  - 0.59 ΔXRAV - 430.66ΔPOP16   +.02ΔPOP 
 (t =)     (7.7)        (2.4)            (-1.0)        (3.0)         (-0.5)             (-2.2)             (5.5)  
                  +.01ΔICC-1+35.69ΔM2AV      R
2 = 88.0%        (11) 
                   (0.0)       (5.1)             D.W.= 1.8,  
 
Notice the effect is to strengthen substantially the statistical significance of the original “income” variable, 
by converting it to a “purchasing power” variable, without significantly changing the estimated effects of 
any of the other variables, and in most cases, increasing their statistical significance as well.  This is an 
indicator that the purchasing power formulation of how income affects consumption is the more 
scientifically accurate.  Another indicator of purchasing power’s appropriateness is to examine its 
contribution to explaining variation in consumer spending.  Dropping the “purchasing power” composite 
variable from the full model reduces explained variance from 88% to 68%.  By comparison, dropping only 
the income reduces explained variance only from 88% to 80%.  
 
The results (two equations above) for the model with borrowing as a separate variable indicate that every 
additional dollar of consumer borrowing results in a $0.20 dollar increase in consumer spending on 
domestically produced consumer goods, ceteris paribus.  Alternatively, we could test demand except for 
that based on borrowing (ΔCD - .20 ΔCBOR).  
 
Δ(CD .20CBOR) = .29Δ(Y-TG) +.18Δ(T -G) -2.67ΔPR+.42 ΔDJ-2  - 0.25 ΔXRAV  -418.90ΔPOP16+.01ΔPOP+.05ΔICC-1 
 (t =)   (4.0)           (5.2)             (2.7)           (-1.2)         (2.6)        (-0.2)           (-2.2)                   (3.7)          (0.2) 
                    +35.48ΔM2AV  R
2 = 84.0%      (12) 
                     (5.6)    D.W.= 1.8 
 
This results in precisely the same regression coefficients.  The difference in these coefficients and the 
Heim (2010) coefficients reflects the full effect these variables have on consumer spending when the full 
value of consumer money demand (income & borrowing) is considered.  Clearly, the level of consumer 
borrowing is systematically related to the level of consumer spending.  
 
The negative impact of deficits on consumer spending is markedly less when borrowing is held constant, 
corroborating the earlier Heim (2010) results.  In the equations above, the marginal effect of an increase 
in the deficit not controlling for borrowing effects is $0.27 per dollar of deficit.  Controlling for the level of 
borrowing it is $0.18.  
 
The regression below shows the effect of borrowed funds on total consumer spending (CT) on both 
imports and domestically produced goods. The original Heim equation without borrowing controlled for, 
was 
 
ΔCT   =.50Δ(Y-TG) +.54Δ(T -G) -10.28ΔPR+.59 ΔDJ-2  = 4.32 ΔXRAV -360.95ΔPOP16+.01ΔPOP+.55ΔICC-1 
 (t =)               (14.7)            (11.5)            (-6.1)        (3.6)          (5.1)             (-1.9)                   (4.7)          (2.2)  
                    +30.34ΔM2AV         R
2 = 96.2%        (13) 
                    (4.7)                 D.W.= 2.1 
 
And the equation with borrowing is  
 
ΔCT   =.45Δ(Y-TG) +.49Δ(T -G) -9.12ΔPR+.70 ΔDJ-2  + 3.33 ΔXRAV +(   -388.94ΔPOP16+.01ΔPOP+.44ΔICC-1 
 (t =)            (9.9)             (8.2)            (-5.2)          (3.7)         (2.9)              (-2.0)                  (4.8)          (1.5)    
                  +28.89ΔM2AV   + .13 ΔCBOR   R
2 = 96.7%        (14) 
                  (5.1)              (1.8)         D.W.= 2.2 
 
Here again, at about the 9% level of confidence, we can show a positive relationship between consumer 
borrowing and total consumption spending, and a drop in the impact of a given sized deficit on consumer 
demand when borrowing effects are controlled for.  Every additional dollar of borrowing is associated with 
$0.13 of additional consumption.   
 
 




When examining the effects of deficits on investment, we should expect to see the deficit having a lesser, 
or no, effect on investment when we control for the level of consumer borrowing as well as the other 
variables mentioned in Heim (2010).  The observed effect may not drop to zero, since crowd out not only 
negatively affects investment, but also consumption, which may cause secondary effects on investment.  
reducing the accelerator, further reducing investment, and reducing taxes, increasing the deficit, which 
also further reduces investment.  Therefore, controlling for the level of business borrowing may not fully 
eliminate the observed effect of the deficit on investment, but should at least reduce it from the levels 
found in Heim (2010) where borrowing was not controlled for.   
 
Heim’s (no borrowing control) investment function was  
 
Domestically Produced Investment Goods 
Δ(ID) =.23ΔACC +.51 Δ(T-G) + .16ΔDEP - .37ΔCAP-1 - 8.22Δr-2  -.28 ΔDJ-2 +.44 ΔPROF-2   + 5.59ΔXRAV  +.008ΔPOP                  (15) 
(t =)      (9.0)          (7.6)           (0.5)     (-0.3)          (-6.6)       (-1.3)          (4.1)   (5.6)              (3.6)       
                    R
2=.90  DW =2.3 
 
Where 
ID   = real domestically produced investment goods  
IT  = total real domestically produced and imported investment goods 
ACC  = a Samuelson accelerator variable measuring the economy’s growth rate (∆ Real GDP) 
DEP  = real business depreciation allowances 
CAP-1  = industrial capacity utilization, lagged one period  
PROF-2 = real corporate profits, lagged two periods 
r-2  = real Prime interest rate, lagged two periods 
 
Other variables in the model are as defined in the consumption function model.  If we add an additional 
variable to control for business borrowing (BBOR), defined as the net increase in consumer debt, our 
regression results become 
 
Δ(ID) =.22ΔACC +.46 Δ(T-G) + .02ΔDEP -.31ΔCAP-1 - 6.87Δr-2  -.17 ΔDJ-2 +.39 ΔPROF-2 + 4.36ΔXRAV  + .008ΔPOP +.10 ΔBBOR 
(t =)      (9.0)          (6.6)           (0.1)     (-0.3)          (-4.0)       (-0.7)         (3.2)   (2.7)       (3.0)         (1.1) 
R
2=.91  DW =2.2             (16) 
 
The results indicate that every additional dollar of business borrowing results in a $0.10 dollar increase in 
business spending on domestically produced investment goods, ceteris paribus.  However, the result is 
statistically insignificant.   
 
Alternatively, we could test investment demand except for that based on borrowing (ΔID - .10 ΔIBOR).  Doing 
so results in precisely the same regression coefficients as shown in the equation immediately above for 
all right hand side variables (except ΔBBOR , which is now part of the left side) .  The difference in these 
coefficients and the Heim (2010) coefficients reflects the full effect these variables have on investment 
spending on domestically produced goods when the full value of business purchasing power (income, 
borrowing) is considered.   
 
The negative impact of deficits on investment spending is less when deficits are not allowed to affect 
business borrowing, corroborating the earlier Heim (2010) results.  That said, not much less; $0.51 versus 
$0.46 cents per dollar of deficit.  This appears to be because the main use of borrowed funds by 
businesses is to spend on imported investment goods.  The regression below shows the effect of 
borrowed funds on total investment spending (IT), where total investment spending is spending on 
domestically produced goods and imported goods. The original Heim equation without borrowing 
controlled for, was  
 
Total Investment  
Δ(IT) =.27ΔACC +.60 Δ(T-G) + .29ΔDEP + .72ΔCAP-1 - 6.79Δr-2  +.08 ΔDJ-2 +.32 ΔPROF-2 +5.16ΔXRAV0123 +.01ΔPOP   
(t =)      (8.2)          (6.4)           (0.8)     (0.6)          (-4.0)        (0.3)           (1.9)   (6.3)            (4.0)    
R
2=.91  D.W. = 2.5          (17) 




Δ(IT) =.25ΔACC +.52 Δ(T-G) +.06ΔDEP + .82ΔCAP-1 -4.65Δr-2  +.25 ΔDJ-2 +.23 ΔPROF-2 +3.21ΔXRAV0123  +.01ΔPOP +.16 ΔBBOR  
(t =)      (8.2)          (5.6)           (0.2)     (0.6)          (-2.5)       (1.2)           (1.2)   (2.9)            (5.3)          (2.6) 
R
2 = 92; D.W. = 2.4         (18) 
 
Here again we see that controlling for its effects on borrowing, the effect of the deficit on investment drops 
more noticeably from $0.60 to $0.52 cents per dollar of deficit, and that $0.16 of every dollar of business 
borrowing is used to increase purchases of investment goods (other portions may represent cash flow 
borrowing, special operational needs, etc.).  The coefficients in the regression function for imported 
investment goods are exactly the same as can be calculated by subtracting the domestically produced 
investment goods equation coefficients from the total investment equation coefficients.  
 
Crowd out theory implies business investment may be best described as a function of purchasing power 
(income and access to borrowing), rather than income alone.  The model below combines these two 
variables into a “purchasing power” variable, and re-estimates it:  
 
Δ(IT) =.25ΔACC +.52 Δ(T-G) + .04ΔDEP + 1.03ΔCAP-1 - 4.00Δr-2  +.26 ΔDJ-2 +.17 Δ(PROF-2+BBOR) +2.85ΔXRAV +.01ΔPOP    
(t =)      (8.1)          (5.5)           (0.2)       (0.9)            (-2.5)         (1.2)          (3.5)     (2.4)        (5.0)     
 R
2= 92  D.W.=2.3           (19) 
 
Notice the “purchasing power variable is substantially more statistically significant than the income 
(profits) variable alone.  Adding depreciation allowances to the “purchasing power” variable strengthens 
the relationship further, as shown below: 
 
Δ(IT) =.25ΔACC +.52 Δ(T-G) + 1.02ΔCAP-1 - 4.20Δr-2  +.22 ΔDJ-2 +.17 Δ(PROF-2+BBOR+DEP) +2.87ΔXRAV +.01ΔPOP              (20) 
(t =)      (8.6)          (5.3)             (0.9)            (-2.8)         (1.4)          (4.1)            (2.5)            (6.6)             
                    R
2= 92,  D.W.=2.3  
 
We conclude that for investment as was the case for consumption, investment spending is systematically 
related to business borrowing; increases/decreases in borrowing are associated with 
increases/decreases.  Business income and borrowing systematically explains more variation in 
investment than business income alone (92.0% versus 90.7%)  
 
 
7.0.  FINDINGS: THE EFFECT OF DEFICITS ON CONSUMER BORROWING 
 
A simple model of the relationship of deficits to consumer borrowing, controlling for a measure of the state 
of the economy (disposable income), indicates deficits are negatively related to consumer borrowing.  
The findings were significant at the 1% level.  The model estimated year to year changes in consumer 
borrowing as a function of year to year changes in disposable income and the deficit.  The results were:  
 
∆(Real Consumer Borrowing) =  + .10 ∆(Disposable Income)  + .34 ∆(T-G)           R
2 =  .23                  (21) 
         (t-Statistic)       (1.7)                 (3.2)    D.W.=1.3 
 
Controlling for other possible determinants of borrowing, as is done further below, also shows the same 
relationship, but not quite as strongly statistically significant.  
 
Graph 3 below shows the estimated (“fitted”) relationship of consumer borrowing and disposable income 
growth over the 1959-2000 period.   
 
Where the fitted value was found to be  
 
(Real Consumer Borrowing) =  - 56.72 + .045 (Disposable Income)          R
2 =  .53                  (22) 
         (t-Statistic)    (-1.8)       (6.6)           D.W.= 0.6 
 
Graph 3 shows that actual consumer borrowing tends to exceed trends in borrowing related to growing 
income in periods of budget surplus or major deficit decline (1959-70, 1992-2000), and falls below the  
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trend in periods of significant deficit growth.  This provides some visual confirmation of the statistically 
significant negative econometric relationship between deficits and borrowing shown earlier.   Borrowing 
data are from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Account; other data are from the 2002 Annual Report of 
the President.   
 
In testing a more complete model of consumer borrowing, the 1960 - 2000 data indicate a statistically 
significant negative relationship between deficits and consumer borrowing, ceteris paribus.  The finding, 
significant at the 8% level (t =1.8), was obtained while controlling for changes in all the other variables 
theorized to be determinants of demand for consumer goods and services in Heim (2010).  They were 
used as controls on the theory that since consumer borrowing is done to finance consumer demand, 
determinants of consumer demand, or some of them, should be determinants of consumer borrowing.  
The controls allow us to examine the relationship of deficits to borrowing holding these other factors 
constant.  The regression results were as follows: 
 
ΔCBOR    =  .39Δ(Y-TG) +.42Δ(T -G) --9.28ΔPR - .91ΔDJ-2  +  7.89 ΔXRAV  + 223.05ΔPOP16   -.02ΔPOP + .88ΔICC-1 
 (t =)       (4.5)            (1.8)            (-1.9)          (2.8)           (4.3)                (0.5)        (-3.1)         (1.1)  
                    +11.55ΔM2AV         R
2 = 63.2%        (23) 
                    (0.4)                D.W.= 1.7 
There was evidence in preliminary testing that borrowing, while a function of the variables listed above, 
grew at a slightly slower rate than the linear growth rates allowed for in this equation.   For example, if the 
disposable income variable is reformulated as Δ (Y-TG)
0.5 , the income variable becomes statistically 
significant and explained variance increases, as shown below  
 
ΔCBOR  =  56.13(Y-TG)
0.5  +.42Δ(T -G)  -9.36ΔPR - .56ΔDJ-2  +  7.72 ΔXRAV  - 147.50ΔPOP16   -.02ΔPOP + .90ΔICC-1 
 (t =)    (4.7)             (1.8)             (-1.9)           (1.7)           (4.3)               (-0.3)        (-3.5)          (1.1)  
                    +1.99ΔM2AV       R
2 = 64.4%          (24) 
                     (0.7)            D.W.= 1.8 
 
The reduction in consumer borrowing per dollar of deficit incurred ($0.42) is very close to the earlier 
finding (Section 5) that consumer spending declined by $0.49 cents, per dollar of deficit.  Hence, the 
linkage between deficits, consumer borrowing and consumer spending required for crowd out theory 
appears to be confirmed by these tests. The linkage suggests declining borrowing associated with deficits 
is the main, and perhaps only, reason for the declining spending associated with deficits. 
 
Alternatively, adding a constant term to the original equation leaves the results varying a bit, but 
essentially unchanged.  Results are shown immediately below: 
 
ΔCBOR  =  -107.90  + .36Δ(Y-TG)  +.45Δ(T -G)  -9.98ΔPR -1.12ΔDJ-2  + 8.81 ΔXRAV  + 333.63ΔPOP16   + .03ΔPOP +1.09ΔICC-1 
 (t =)       (-1.7)     (3.8)        (1.8)             (-1.8)         (-2.7)           (3.9)               (0.7)               (1.0)          (1.4)  
                    +24.94ΔM2AV    R
2 = 64.6%          (25) 
                    (0.9)             D.W.= 1.8 
 
Whichever formulation is used shows a statistically significant negative relationship between consumer 
borrowing and government deficits at the 8% level.  The results also show most other variables affecting 
consumer spending also affect (the same people’s) demand for consumer loans, and in the same 
direction.   
 
This model provides information on which variables are important determinants of consumers’ desire to 
borrow.  As Table 3 below  shows, the deficit explains 7.2% of the total variance, exceeded only by the 
income measure (12.2%) and exchange rate  measure (12.5%), using the “1
st out” stepwise regression 
method.  Using “1
st in” stepwise regression, the deficit explains (17.2%) of the total variance, more than 
any other variables except disposable income and the exchange rate measure 
 
Either way the deficit’s contribution to explaining variance in consumer borrowing is calculated, it is 
substantial.  Generally, 1
st out estimates are considered underestimates; 1






TABLE 3:  CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXPLAINED VARIANCE 
 
Determinant of     Variance in Borrowing Explained By    
Consumer Borrowing   1
st Out Method    1
st In Method*. 
 
Exchange RateAV      12.5%    20.1% 
Disposable Income      12.2      33.6 
DJ Composite Av.-2       8.2        1.0 
Deficits          7.2      17.2 
Interest Rate          4.9        2.5 
Population Size        4.4        1.4 
Consumer Confidence-1      2.7      12.9 
M2AV            0.4        3.7 
Pop. Ratio(16-24)/65+       0.2        0.1 
                     . 
    *Constant term included 
 
 
8.0.  FINDINGS: THE EFFECT OF DEFICITS ON BUSINESS BORROWING 
 
The 1960 - 2000 data indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between deficits and 
business borrowing, ceteris paribus.  The finding, significant at the 1.5% level, was obtained while 
controlling for changes in all the other variables commonly theorized to be determinants of business 
demand  for investment goods.  They were used as controls on the theory that since business borrowing 
is done to finance investment demand, determinants of business investment, or some of them, should be 
determinants of business borrowing.  The model also allows for portfolio balancing considerations: 
financing must come from internal sources (profits), or externally from borrowing or equities.  The controls 
allow us to examine the relationship of deficits to borrowing holding these other factors constant. 
 
Beside crowd out, other variables found significantly negatively related to business borrowing include 
interest rates and the stock market level (higher stock prices make financing investments by issuing stock 
more attractive than borrowing).  The exchange rate was found positively related to borrowing (higher 
rates reduce the cost of imported investment goods; increasing demand for them, and to the extent they 
are financed by borrowing, demand for borrowing may rise).   
 
∆(Real Business Borrowing) = .09∆(Accelerator) +1.43 ∆(Depreciation) -.59 ∆(Capacity Util.-1) 
         (t-Statistic)    (0.7)        (1.1)     (-0.2) 
  
        - 13.64 ∆(Real Prime Interest Rate) + .56 ∆ (Real ProfitsAV)   
           (-2.7)               (1.4) 
 
        -1.10 ∆ (Tobin’s qProxy) - .01 ∆ (Population Size)  
          (-1.9)      (-0.5) 
 
        +12.39 ∆(Exchange RateAV ) +.48 ∆(T-G)             R
2 = .56        (26) 
           (4.0)                (2.6)              D.W.= 1.9 
 
However, this model does not quite as explicitly control for the state of the economy when estimating the 
effect of the deficit on business borrowing.  A slightly simpler model that holds the state of the economy 
(variations in the GDP) constant when testing for factors influencing borrowing is as follows: 
 
∆(Real Business Borrowing) =  .13 ∆(Real GDP)   +.49 ∆(T-G) -7.05 ∆(Real Prime Interest Rate)  
         (t-Statistic)    (2.7)       (2.9)           (-3.4)   
  
        - 0.90 ∆(Tobin’s qProxy) + 10.30 ∆(Exchange RateAV)    R
2 = .50           (27) 




DEVIATIONS OF ACTUAL CONSUMER BORROWING FROM TREND 
(BILLIONS OF 1996 DOLLARS) 
   
The reduction in business borrowing per dollar of deficit incurred ($0.49) is very close to the earlier finding 
that consumer spending declined by $0.52 cents, per dollar of deficit, and the earlier Heim (2010) finding 
of a $0.60 cents reduction.  Hence, the linkage between deficits, business borrowing and consumer 
spending required for crowd out theory appears confirmed by these tests. 
 
This model provides essentially the same conclusions as to which variables are important determinants of 
business desire to borrow while controlling more explicitly for the effects of the business cycle.  Here 
again, one of the most significant determinants of business borrowing is crowd out, i.e., the government 
deficit, significant at the 1% level.  The deficit explains a 10% of the total variance, exceeded only by the 
exchange rate (14%) using the “1
st out” stepwise regression method.  Using “1
st in” stepwise regression, it 
explains 25% of the total variance, more than any other variable. 
 
 
TABLE 4: CONTRIBUTIONS TO EXPLAINED VARIANCE 
 
Determinant of    Variance in Borrowing Explained By    
Business Borrowing   1
st Out Method    1
st In Method. 
 
Deficits          10%          25% 
GDP             6           15 
Exchange Rate        14           13 
Interest Rate            3           12 
DJ Composite Av.         6             1 
      (Tobin’s q Proxy)                  
                     . 
  
 
Graph 4 below shows the trend in borrowing growth associated with growth in the GDP.  The trend line is 












1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Residual Actual Fitted 
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∆ Business Borrowing = - $51.76 Billion + .36 ∆ (Real GDP)   R
2 =.29             (28) 
  (t-Statistic)    (-1.9)       (2.9)      D.W. 1.3 
 
Actual borrowing tended to equal or exceed the predicted  trend in periods of budget surplus or declining 
deficits(1964-70, most of the 1990’s), and fall below the trend in periods of significant deficit growth 
(1975, 1985-94). Though there are exceptions, (late 1990’s, when real interest rates had risen to their 
highest levels since the mid-1980’s, reducing borrowing), the general trend is visible. 
 
 
        GRAPH 4 
DEVIATIONS IN BUSINESS BORROWING FROM TREND 
(BILLIONS OF 1996 DOLLARS) 
             
 
9.0.   CROWD OUT EFFECTS IN RECESSIONS: THE 1981 - 83 RECESSION AS A CASE STUDY  
 
Theoretically, even in recessions, when demand for loans declines, government deficits financed by 
borrowing could cause crowd out if the recession causes savings to decline as much or more than loan 
demand.  In this situation any new deficit will crowd out private borrowing, with two exceptions: 
 
1.  if private borrowers can borrow from abroad to compensate for the decline in domestic savings 
available because used to finance the deficit.  
 
2.  if government borrowing to finance the deficit is from foreign sources, such as China or Saudi 
Arabia, rather than from domestic savings. 
 
For example, in the 1981- 83 recession period covered by this study, Table 5 shows both total gross 
domestic savings and total gross investment dropped $30.5 billion (correcting for the statistical 
discrepancy between the two accounts).  During the same period, foreign borrowing increased $38.4 
billion.  Had this not occurred, investment would have had to drop more, since total savings (foreign and 
domestic) must equal total investment (business and government).  How much more investment would 
have dropped depends on how interest rates rose in response to the savings supply/investment demand 
imbalance.  Any increase  would likely cause domestic savings to rise and domestic business borrowing 













1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Residual Actual Fitted 
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what actually occurred.  Nonetheless, it is clear that investment would have fallen even further than it did 
($30.5 billion) if business and government had not been able to access foreign saving.  
 
Alternatively, with foreign borrowing at $38.4 billion, but borrowing to finance government investment 
been $16 billion less (reducing the deficit a similar amount), $16 billion in savings would have been freed 
up for private use.  Business investment may not have declined at all, and may have grown (again, an 
empirical question, since we don’t know the effect on interest rates).  Hence, interpreting the effect of the 
actual decline in savings on private investment crowd out is difficult to do simply by inspecting the 
available Flow of Funds data.  Better information is probably provided by the behavioral econometric 
models of earlier sections, which do indicate crowd out is a problem. 
 
Clearly though, even without a deficit, without foreign borrowing to compensate for the decline in 
domestic saving, there would have been draconian cutbacks in private borrowing.  To finance a 
government deficit as well out of domestic savings, private borrowing cutbacks would have had to be 
even greater.  Even with foreign borrowing available, since business and government investment must 
equal domestic and foreign savings, greater borrowing - financed government investment, given the level 
of savings, must mean less private investment if the identity is to be maintained.  In this sense, 
abstracting from behavioral effects, the flow of funds clearly implies crowd out must always result when 




1981-83 SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT 
(BILLIONS OF CURRENT DOLLARS) 
                           
Year  Total Gross   Personal  Business   Gov’t.    Depreciation 
         Saving    Savings    Savings    Savings    Allowance Savings     
1981  $646.1    $236.7    $  65.2    $-  49.2   $  393.3 
1983    602.4      226.9        95.7      -171.4       451.1 
Chge.  $-43.7    $ - 9.8    $+30.5    $-122.2   $+  57.8 
                           
 
 
                           
Year  Total Gross  Private         Gov’t.  Net Capital  Net Foreign.  | Statistical Discrepancy 
         Investment  Domestic I  Investment  Acct. Trans.  Lending  /Bor.  | (Investment>Savings) 
1981  $ 682.6   $572.4        $106.9       $0.1   $   3.2    |         $   36.6 
1983     652.1     564.3          122.9         0.1     -35.2    |              49.7 
Chge.  $ - 30.5   $  - 8.1        $+16.0       $0.0   $ -38.4    |         $ +13.1 
_______________________                     
Source: Flow of Funds Data cited in Economic Report of the President, 2010, Table B-32) 
 
 
Technical Note:  Total investment should equal total domestic and foreign savings.  It does not in the 
Flow of Funds data.  the statistical discrepancy shows total investment exceeding total saving.  This may 
result from either over counting investment or under counting saving.  Subtracting the discrepancy from 
1981 and 1983 Investment leaves the changes in investment and saving equal at $-43.7 billion; adding 
the discrepancy to savings in those years leaves investment equal to saving at $ -30.5 billion.  That is 
what we have done.   Basically, the change in investment and saving relevant to the crowd out issue is  
 
$ - 8.1∆(Bus Inv.) +16.0 ∆(G Inv.) = + 38.4 ∆(Increased For. Borrowing) - 30.5 ∆(Domestic Saving) 
 
     $ +7.9 net investment       =               $ + 7.9 net increase in available savings                            (29) 
Or  
 
$ - 8.1 (∆Business Investment)  = $ 7.9 (Net increase in available saving) -16.0 (Increase Gov’t.   
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           Investment)               (30) 
 
As an accounting identity, the flow of funds data say that for a given level of available saving, if 
government investment goes up, private investment must go down.  However, there are behavioral 
relationships involved.  If increased government (or private) investment demand is financed by increased 
savings availability (through interest rate changes or some other mechanism), no reduction in the other 
type of investment need occur.  Econometric analysis of these behavioral relationships is needed.  The 
econometrics analysis shown earlier in this paper shows a systematic negative relationship between 
deficits and private borrowing over the 1960 - 2000 period, and that the decline in private borrowing is 
virtually equal to the decline in private total consumption and investment spending that occurs, i.e., the 
crowd out effect of borrowing - financed deficits is total; the stimulus effects of the deficit are completely 
offset by decreased private spending.  Access to Foreign borrowing may increase total savings available 
for investment, but whatever total is available, must be divided between private and government 
investment; if one goes up, the other must go down, as the flow of funds accounts indicate.  We conclude 
the flow of funds data and the behavioral data are in full agreement. 
 
10.0.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
1.   Adding a variable for consumer borrowing to a well specified consumption function estimating the 
demand for domestically produced consumer goods, adds two percent to explained variance and 
is statistically significant at the 2% level.  Combining it with disposable income to form a “total 
purchasing power” form of the income variable raises the t statistic even more; from 4.0 on the 
income variable alone, and 2.3 on the borrowing variable alone, to 7.7 on the joint variable.  Also, 
controlling for its effect on borrowing, reduces the effect of the deficit on consumer spending by a 
third.  Secondary effects of deficits, through their effect on investment crowd out, which 
subsequently adversely affects consumption, were not controlled for, may explain the remaining 
statistical significance of crowd out effects.  (Section 5.0) 
 
2.  Adding a variable for investment borrowing to a well specified investment function estimating the 
demand for domestically produced investment goods adds only one percent to explained 
variance and is statistically insignificant.  This appears to be the case because crowd out mainly 
affects purchases of imported investment goods.  Running the same test on total investment 
spending (domestic and imports) adds two percent to explained variance and is statistically 
significant at close to the 1% level.  Combining it with business income to form a “total purchasing 
power” form of the income variable raises the t statistic even more; from 1.2 on the income 
variable alone, and 2.6 on the borrowing variable alone, to 3.5 on the joint variable.  Also, 
controlling for its effect on borrowing reduces the effect of the deficit on investment spending by a 
13 percent.  Secondary effects of deficits, through their effect on consumption crowd out, which 
subsequently adversely affects investment, were not controlled for in the investment equation. 
These effects can still be seen in the investment function as remaining crowd out effects.  
(Section 6.0) 
 
3.  Most of the same factors found to explain consumer demand also explained consumer borrowing, 
as expected. Consumer borrowing was inversely related to deficits at high levels of statistical 
significance (0.017% - 0.003% levels of confidence).  Estimates indicated consumer borrowing 
declined by 0.54 cents per dollar of deficit incurred (Eq. 26), and consumer spending by 0.49 (Eq. 
14), matching closely the earlier 0.54 Heim study finding of the effect of deficits on total consumer 
demand.  This of course corroborates the finding of that study suggesting a strong crowd out 
effect, Using Stepwise regression methods, deficits explained more variance in consumer 
borrowing than any other variables except consumer wealth and the ratio of young to old in the 
population (1
st out method), and more than any other variables except consumer wealth and 
disposable income (1
st in method). .(Section 7.0) 
 
4.  Most of the same factors found to explain investment demand also explained business borrowing, 
as was expected. Business borrowing was inversely related to deficits at high levels of statistical 
significance (0.017% - 0.007% levels of confidence).  Estimates indicated that business  
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borrowing declined by 0.48 cents per dollar of deficit incurred (Eq. 26), and spending declined by 
0.52 cents per dollar of deficit incurred (Eq. 18).  Coupled with the estimated consumption effect, 
it appears deficits may result in complete crowd out of private borrowing (Section 8.0).  These 
estimates approximate the findings of the earlier Heim study (0.60 decline in investment per dollar 
of deficit), supports the assertion in that study that crowd out was the channel through which 
deficits affected the level of investment. 
 
5.  The 1981 -83 flow of funds data clearly show that total available saving (foreign and domestic), 
equaled total business and government investment.  This is an accounting identity that must 
always hold, and implies that for any given level of saving, increased government investment 
must always come at the expense of equal amounts of private investment.  This is essentially the 
same result shown by the behavioral responses to government deficits, where the equations 
showed that roughly half of every dollar increase in government deficits reduces consumer 
borrowing (and spending) by an equivalent amount; the other half reduces business borrowing 
(and spending) an equivalent amount.  These behavioral results, given in equations 13 and 17, 
and 14 and 18,  also meet the theoretical conditions required for tax and government spending 
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